1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK		
2		. Case No. 05-17923 (ASH)	
3	IN RE:	. (Jointly Administered)	
4	DELTA AIR LINES, INC., et al,		
5	Debtors.	. Monday, May 21, 2007	
6		•	
7	TRANSCRIPT OF TELEPHONE CONFERENCE BEFORE THE HONORABLE ADLAI S. HARDIN		
8	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE		
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25		

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(Proceedings commence at 4:51 p.m.)
1
        (Call to order of the Court.)
2
            THE COURT: Okay. Do I have a sheet on this? Okay.
3
   Who's on with regard to Delta?
4
            MR. WILES: Your Honor, this is Michael Wiles, from
5
   Debevoise & Plimpton, on behalf of Delta.
6
            THE COURT: Okay.
7
            MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, it's Kristopher Hansen, with
8
   Stroock & Stroock & Lavan, on behalf of Delta.
9
            THE COURT: Okay.
10
            MR. BOTTER: Good afternoon, Your Honor. David Botter
11
   and Mitchell Hurley, from Akin, Gump, Strauss, Hauer & Feld, on
12
   behalf of the Post-Effective Date Committee.
13
            THE COURT: Okay.
14
            MR. SMOLEV: Your Honor, for DFO Partners, Richard
15
   Smolev of Kaye Scholer. We are in TIA/SLV Objection 1.
16
            THE COURT: Okay.
17
            MS. FENNING: Your Honor, Lisa Fenning of Dewey
18
   Ballantine, on behalf of Northwestern Mutual Life. We are the
19
   claimants on the TIA Objection 2.
20
            MR. ELLIOTT: Your Honor, Mark Elliott and Mark Busey
21
    (phonetic), for the Wilmington Trust Company and Cargill, SLV
   plaintiffs.
23
            THE COURT: Okay. And which objection? One or two?
24
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MR. ELLIOTT: One, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. 1 MR. EDELMAN: Good afternoon, Your Honor. This is 2 Michael Edelman, along with my partner, John Bogaard, from 3 Vedder Price. We're here for Strategic Value Partners on TIA 4 SLV No. 1, and Bank of America, on TIA SLV No. 2. 5 THE COURT: Okay. 6 MR. CROWLEY: Your Honor, Leo Crowley, Eric Fishman 7 and Margot Erlich, from Pillsbury, Winthrop, Shaw & Pittman, 8 for the Bank of New York, as Indenture Trustee, and we're here 9 on two of the aircraft and Objection No. 2. 10 THE COURT: Okay. Is that everybody? 11 MS. SPRINGER: No, Your Honor. This is Claudia 12 Springer, and with me is my partner, Kurt Gwynne. We're on for 13 PNC Leasing. We filed an administrative brief in the case. THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. PARTEE: And, Your Honor, Peter Partee, from 16 Hunton & Williams, here on behalf of Verizon, owner 17 participants. We're also involved in the three respective 18 objection (indiscernible). 19 20 MR. ROSENZWEIG: Your Honor, it's David Rosenzweig of Fulbright & Jaworski on behalf of BNY, as owner and 21 participant. We also filed amicus papers on -- over the lease 22 23 objection.

MR. TORF: Your Honor, this is Jason Torf, appearing on behalf of ALF5, LLC, with respect to two tail numbers

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indicated by Objection 5(d). We came in late, and did not file
1
   an amicus on one and two, but are obviously interested parties
2
3
   here.
            THE COURT: All right.
4
            MR. DOSHI: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Amish Doshi,
5
   with Day Pitney (sic), on behalf of Fifth Third Bank and the
6
   Fifth Third Leasing Company, Inc. We're not part of one and
7
   two, but we're a party in interest in the objection that's been
8
   filed with respect to our claims in 5(f).
9
            THE COURT: Okay.
10
            MR. CALIFANO: And, Your Honor, Tom Califano and Vince
11
   Roldan, from DLA Piper, on behalf of Marriott, who is also an
12
   owner participant.
13
            MR. MARGOLIN: Your Honor, Jeffrey Margolin, from
14
   Hughes, Hubbard & Reed, representing DaimlerChrysler, a party
15
   in interest, and (indiscernible).
16
            MR. KANOWITZ: This is Richard Kanowitz, Your Honor,
17
   on behalf of certain Trilogy entities. We, likewise, represent
18
   the owner participants in Objections 3 and 5.
19
20
            THE COURT: Okay. Is that it? Well, that's a fine
   big group.
21
            Mr. Wiles, why don't you start the conversation and
22
23
   tell me where we are?
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I got a call last week from your clerks, both from

MR. WILES: Thank you, Your Honor.

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Rosemary and from Melanie, asking if we thought it would be useful to have a conference to discuss whether anything remained to be done on Test Cases 1 and 2, with what we anticipated. I know a lot of people on the phone are more interested in what we're going to do with all of the other TIA/SLV objections that we have, and I don't anticipate trying to address any of that today. A telephone conference seems like an unruly and disorderly way to do that.

I asked the Court -- the scheduling clerk this morning if there was a date when we might be able to have such a conference to discuss broader issues and scheduling of what issues we're going to take up next and how we're going to do all this, and tentatively, she's told me June 6th, so I will be sending a notice out to that and back.

But I did want to take the Court up on the offers that Rosemary and Melanie, I think, last week, to at least tell you what the parties to Test Cases 1 and 2 thought as to whether there was something left to be done on those particular objections.

THE COURT: Yes. I was concerned that I hadn't at all covered the waterfront, and I probably haven't, in my case, to get out a decision that I thought covered the -- hopefully the principal issues, but tell me if I've let you down.

MR. WILES: You certainly haven't let us down, although I would have preferred to see rulings in my favor

across the board, but on Test Case 1, which is the one that I speak for Delta on, there is an issue that I don't think you needed to reach in light of what you ruled, since you ruled, I guess, for the objectors. But it was the issue of if there had been a TIA claim, would the SLV claim have had to be reduced, and I think, on Test Case 2, I have a conflict, so I have to defer to Mr. Hansen to discuss the extent to which that issue remains open on Test Case 2.

THE COURT: In other words, the issue is -- let me just see if I understand it. In a situation where there had been a TIA claim, for some reason, that did not trigger an SLV claim, and the TIA claim had been paid, would that then reduce the amount of the SLV claim pro tanto? Is that the issue?

MR. WILES: Yes. I think I would put it slightly differently. We have TIA claims and SLV claims, so the issue is -- I think I'll let Mr. Hansen speak further. But to the extent that you've ruled that the TIA claim isn't wiped out, the other half of the issue is that the SLV claim needs to be adjusted.

MR. HANSEN: That's right, Your Honor. It's Kris
Hansen at Stroock. And with respect to Test Case 2, you have
(indiscernible) with respect to Tail No. 182DN, which was one
of the Bingham termsheet claims, and with respect to that
ruling, you had found that our objection, Delta's objection to
the TIA claim there was overruled. And so, in that instance,

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if there was a claim on behalf of the TIA that survived, that SLV would have to be adjusted to the extent there was going to be a payment with respect to the TIA.

MR. EDELMAN: Your Honor, this is Michael Edelman from Vedder Price.

I actually think that you have reached that ruling. In your decision, you held that based upon the undisputed facts of the case, the SLV readjustment provision of the participation agreement is not applicable. I think that's at twelve. And I think that reading closely your decision, you have — or you reason that because prior to the bankruptcy, the owner/participant did not demand payment under the TIA, that — I read that as the timing of the maturity of the SLV claim gave rise to the fact that there was no ability for a later readjustment, if a TIA claim, where (indiscernible). So I think you have made a ruling on the issue that the debtor counsels have just stated.

THE COURT: Okay. I think you -- I think Mr. Edelman is right, but I want to make sure that I really understand the facts. My understanding in Point C on the last page of my decision concerning Tail No. 182DN was that there was no SLV claim on that plane, one of what was it, eighty-nine planes that were the subject of a settlement agreement, that resulted in an agreement that Delta would allow a claim in an amount calculated without any reference to SLV. That was the

predicate of my ruling on 182DN, that there was no SLV claim and no claim calculated or, quote, "determined by reference to," stipulated loss value.

That being the case, construing the agreement, the TIA, as written, there was no bar to a TIA claim, but there's also no SLV claim.

MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, it's Kris Hansen at Stroock again.

We actually have a point that we wanted to raise to Your Honor, as well with respect to Point B of your decision on Tail 182DN. The termsheet actually has a provision in it that described a calculation of pre-petition damage claims/unsupported claims. In point one of that, it states pretty clearly that in the case of an aircraft lease, and the way you get to the claim is by starting from the stipulated law and value, and it cites (indiscernible) in there a couple of times, so I think that, you know, Delta's position with respect to that is to say that the claims with respect to 182DN under their termsheet are clearly calculated with respect to the stipulated loss value.

MS. FENNING: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. FENNING: This is Lisa Fenning, for Northwestern Mutual on Number 2.

Our argument was that the termsheet was a deal that

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was contrary to the terms of the operative documents and, therefore, it could not, as a matter of contract law or of communal law, qualify as an SLV claim that's in the meaning of the operative document, even if it mentioned the word SLV.

And by the way, I would note, Your Honor, that we were quite concerned with the discussion of TIA Claim No. 2 because you mentioned, in Footnote 3, that you did not have access to the operative documents. We, in fact, submitted all of the relevant operative documents under seal. You signed an order allowing us to do so. We submitted a batch of copies on the open record, and we're quite concerned that perhaps you were not aware that you actually had all the documents, because you indicated that you couldn't refer to them or analyze them in reaching the ruling.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I said what I said in Footnote 3, and I didn't have in front of me, as I was working on this, those documents. In any event --

MS. FENNING: Well, they were submitted to the Court, Your Honor, and you have a full set of the relevant documents, and we had urged that you look at the documents as a whole, and we're concerned that that may not have happened.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this. Is there anything in my ruling that you think would be different, had I looked at the documents?

MS. FENNING: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: What?

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MS. FENNING: We believe that you failed to take into account the fact of the survival language, it was not discussed in your ruling at all, which required that it be paid in full, and that the TIA agreement survived the termination of the agreement. We believe that you failed to fully consider the effect on the interlocking provisions of how the payments are to be made under the terms of the lease, and the fact that they do call for payments in U.S. dollars, and I think it's just important to read the document in substantial text, so that you can see how they fit together and how they are negotiated, and we're concerned the conclusions were being drawn without full consideration of the documents, because you were not apparently aware that you, in fact, have the full set of documents before you.

THE COURT: Let me ask this. If you were to submit a further piece by way of a motion to reconsider, and by the way, I welcome motions to reconsider, I always reconsider when I get a motion to reconsider, but if you were to file a piece of paper saying, Judge, please reconsider, and when you do, consider these passages from these documents, would you quote anything other than you did in your -- in the submission that I saw?

MS. FENNING: Well, Your Honor, we're concerned that you didn't read the submission that we made because we

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repeatedly explained that we have submitted the operative documents, and that raised concern when you did not mention many of the provisions we cited to you in our brief, whether you, in fact, had our brief in front of you at the time you were working on the decision.

I'd be happy to do that, but I'm sure you can appreciate my concern, because many subjects were not mentioned here in your opinion.

THE COURT: Yes. Let me ask the question again, because I think my question was unclear.

If you were to write a brief saying, Judge, please reconsider, would you cite anything to me that you didn't cite in the paper that I have already looked at?

MS. FENNING: In general, or specifically with respect to quotations out of the document?

THE COURT: Would you quote anything from any of the operative documents that you didn't quote already in the brief that you submitted to the Court?

MS. FENNING: Probably, yes. We would have focused on how some of the provisions link together with respect to the calculations of the liquidated damages aspect of the TIA.

There would be a number of things.

We would also, more generally, have cited you to Travelers Insurance Company, which is a Supreme Court case that came down too late for us to include in our brief, given our

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briefing deadline, which we think bears upon the -- directly upon the issue of how the Bankruptcy Courts are supposed to interpret documents and whether it's permissible to take into account the fact that the interpretation that's occurring in the Bankruptcy Court. Travelers, in our view, stands for the proposition and it reiterates prior case law, but clarifying that the Court must interpret contracts as if they are being interpreted, in effect, in state court or other state court standards, rather than importing a concept of allowability or other bankruptcy concepts into the actual interpretation of what the contract is saying.

THE COURT: Let me ask this.

MS. FENNING: And we urge that that be considered, as well, and we do intend to bring a motion for reconsideration on that ground.

THE COURT: Ms. Fenning, were you the party that made the argument that I quoted at the top of Page 14, quote:

"The contention is that 'Section 6(c) of the TIA is triggered only when the lessee actually pays all of the SLV, or the termination value, or a payment calculated with reference to either, in U.S.

Dollars.'"

MS. FENNING: Yes.

THE COURT: Okay. well, I think I've paid rather close attention to your brief and to the provisions that you

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quoted.
1
            Okay. Going back to Mr. Hansen, I forget.
2
   termsheet was part of the exhibits. Is that correct?
                                                           Hello?
3
            MR. SMOLEV: Your Honor, this is Richard Smolev.
4
            In the DFO exhibits that were the demonstrative aids,
5
   a copy of the Bingham termsheet was included in that, with some
6
   highlighted language.
7
            THE COURT: This is the termsheet that governed 182DN?
8
            MR. SMOLEV:
                         Yes, sir.
9
            THE COURT: Okay. Which of you is aggrieved by my
10
   ruling under Paragraph C, as in Charlie, on Page 15?
11
            MR. SMOLEV: Page what, Your Honor?
12
            THE COURT: Fifteen. The last page of my decision.
13
            MR. SMOLEV: Your Honor, the debtor and the committee
14
   would be aggrieved by that ruling.
15
            THE COURT:
                        Okay.
16
            MR. HANSEN: Yeah. That's our position, Your Honor.
17
   The debtor would be aggrieved by that ruling.
18
            THE COURT:
                        Yeah.
19
20
            MR. SMOLEV: And, Your Honor, if I might, this is
   Richard Smolev for DFO. I don't know if this is the
21
   appropriate time to talk about TIA/SLV Objection 1.
22
23
            THE COURT: No, no, it's not. I'm trying to focus on
   182.
24
            MR. SMOLEV:
                        Okay. No, no, no. But I do have a
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comment with respect to where some of my tails rank in relation
1
   to 182, but I will stand down if you want me to discuss all of
2
   the concerns about Objection 1 at the same time.
3
            THE COURT: I just want to know, what don't I have
4
   right with regard to 182? Where did I miss the boat?
5
            MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, it's Kris Hansen at Stroock
6
   again.
7
            I think that it was Exhibit 11, I believe, to our --
8
   spoke to our objection, and if you look to Page -- you have to
9
   go past the order that was previously entered with respect to
10
   the termsheet. If you look to the actual termsheets themselves
11
12
            THE COURT: Is that Exhibit 11?
13
            MR. HANSEN: That is Exhibit 11. Yup.
14
            THE COURT: All right.
15
            MR. HANSEN: And as you go to Exhibit 1 of --
16
            THE COURT: Wait. Wait a second. Exhibit 11, Page
17
   what?
18
            MR. HANSEN: Well, Your Honor, there's a number of
19
   exhibits within Exhibit 11. If you go to Page 2 of the
20
   restructuring termsheet, which is pretty far in --
21
            THE COURT: Page 2 of the termsheet?
22
23
            MR. HANSEN: Page 2 of the termsheet.
            THE COURT:
                        Okay.
24
            MR. HANSEN: You'll see, in bold text, on the bottom
25
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left of that page, the language, calculation of pre-petition damage claim/unsecured claim.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. HANSEN: And if you look down, what that says is that the debtor, the plan parties (sic), and the committee agree that the plan parties will have an unsecured, prepetition claim for the deficiency amount shall be calculated as follows (indiscernible).

If you look at 1(a), it says:

"In the case an aircraft lease, the sum of (i) stipulated loss value, calculated as of the filing date, pursuant to the existing lease, as if a payment of stipulated loss value, as the case may be, were to be made on such date."

So it's our position that that's, as you read (indiscernible) loss value again, but that triggers the payment plan, and now, in reference to stipulated loss value.

THE COURT: I see. I'm sorry. I'll have to look at that again because I believe that must have gone over my head. So just so I know where I'm looking, it's Exhibit 11, Page 2, which is the termsheet, and it's Page 2.

MR. HANSEN: That's right, Your Honor. It's Page 2 of the termsheet. And in Exhibit 11, your order entering a process by which the termsheets will be -- and the termsheet modifications be undertaken, and how people will enter into

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deals with those (indiscernible), it's listed as Exhibit 1
1
   within Tab 11.
2
             THE COURT: What did he just say?
3
             Say that again, will you please?
4
            MR. HANSEN: Sure, Your Honor. My apologies. The
5
   exhibits are a little cumbersome.
6
             Page 10 of 11 (sic) is Delta's reply to Objection No.
7
   2.
8
             THE COURT: Oh, it's 10 of 11.
9
            MR. HANSEN: At Tab 11.
10
             THE COURT: Well, where in Tab 11 do you want me to
11
   look?
12
            MR. HANSEN: There is an Exhibit 1 within Tab 11.
13
            THE COURT: Yeah?
14
            MR. HANSEN: See, there's a piece of, you know, a tab
15
   sticking out that says "Exhibit 1." When you flip to Exhibit
16
   1, that's your order approving a modified termsheet and an
17
   extension of the Section 1110 deadline with respect to the
18
   eighty-eight aircraft.
19
20
             THE COURT: Is the termsheet attached to Exhibit 1
   part of Tab 11?
21
            MR. HANSEN: Yes, it is.
22
23
             THE COURT: All right. And it's -- I'll look at Page
       Well, I'll look at it.
   2.
24
             MR. HANSEN: Thank you, Your Honor.
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MS. FENNING: Your Honor, this is Lisa Fenning.

I would call your attention to, also, the copies of the proofs of claim filed by the Bank of New York. There were submitted as part of our submission. The proof of claim does not state on its face that it was an SLV claim, and that was the basis for our argument as far as the face of the document is concerned, but the gist of our argument was that the termsheet that -- the termsheet deals with, contrary to terms of the contract, the underlying operative document, and that, as you note in your opinion, Delta acknowledges that the amount calculated under the termsheet formula is far lower than any SLV amount would ever be calculated on a lease.

And so the termsheets themselves are contrary to the terms of the operative documents and would be prohibited by the terms of the operative documents, as we set forth in detail in our response. So that the mere fact that the termsheet has the term SLV in it does not mean that the SLV calculated or permitted or had contemplated, under the terms of the operative document.

So we would urge that if you take a look at this issue again, and we believe that you correctly decided it in the first place, but if you look at this issue again, that you consider whether the termsheets are, in fact, prohibited by the operative documents themselves, and contrary to it.

THE COURT: Why are they prohibited?

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MS. FENNING: As we set forth in our response, Delta is not allowed to cut a deal with the debt on these claims to keep the airplane, without the permission of the owner/participant. The idea, the way these deals are structured is that at the end of the day, there will be an objective calculation of the claim value by a foreclosure sale or an assumption of the continued operation under the existing lease, turning it back over to the owner/participant at the end of the lease, but under no circumstances under the terms of the operative documents is Delta allowed to cut a new deal, a new lease with the debt directly, by which it keeps the plane. Delta keeping the plane under a new lease and paying the debt is a prohibited outcome under the terms of the contract, just for the very purpose that it would entirely skew and upset the negotiated economics of the deal and the terms that the parties agreed on up front.

So it cannot be said that a deal that is contrary to the provisions of the contract constitute the calculation of SLV within the meaning of these documents. So however they want to -- whatever number they want to use to calculate their claim, they can do that, but it doesn't make it qualify as an SLV claim under the terms of the contract, and the number doesn't bear the remotest relationship to what is on the SLV table statement, you'll see attached to the lease when you look at the operative documents. The number bears no relationship

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to the number that would be across the page from the date -- of
1
   the petition date or whatever comparable date you use to try
2
   and determine what the appropriate SLV amount --
3
            THE COURT: Ms. Fenning, that's very helpful. May I
4
   try to articulate what you just said, so you will know whether
5
   I got it?
6
            MS. FENNING: Yes.
7
            THE COURT: Okay.
8
            MS. FENNING: Of course.
9
            THE COURT: You've just explained to me that the
10
   termsheet deal is either prohibited by or totally inconsistent
11
   with the remedies section, including this SLV provision,
12
   because the SLV provision contemplates and provides that Delta
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   can't keep the plane, and has to basically sell the plane, as I
14
   recall, and remit the proceeds to the lenders. Is that part of
15
   it?
16
            MS. FENNING: Yes.
17
            THE COURT: And --
18
            MS. FENNING: There are several alternatives.
                                                             That's
19
   one of them.
                 Yes.
20
            THE COURT: Okay. So that if you're going to rely on
21
   an SLV provision, then the termsheet deal is simply not
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23
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consistent with that at all, and even if there's a reference to SLV, it cannot be SLV because this central element of SLV simply isn't present here, correct?

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MS. FENNING: Yes, Your Honor. That's exactly what I 1 was trying to say. 2 THE COURT: Okay. That's extremely helpful. I will 3 look back at the Tab 11, Exhibit 1, Page 2, and consider that 4 in light of what you've just articulated, and reconsider my 5 ruling on Page 15 on 182. 6 MS. FENNING: Your Honor, our response walks you 7 through the pertinent terms of the various operative documents 8 that relate to this issue, and gives you a road map for that 9 analysis. 10 THE COURT: That's right. And what tab number is your 11 response? 12 MS. FENNING: Your Honor, I don't have access to the 1.3 tab numbers. The debtor will have to tell you where they put our response. 15 MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, it's Kris Hansen. 16 We'll find that tab for you. Just two points I wanted 17 to address with you when you're --18 THE COURT: Okay. I will find it. I remember the 19 submission, Ms. Fenning, very well. 20 MS. FENNING: All right. Thank you, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Thank you. Go ahead, Mr. Hansen. 22 23 MR. HANSEN: Just a few points I wanted to bring to Your Honor's attention while you're considering the issues regarding Point (p) (sic) and Ms. Fenning's argument. 25

You know, the first one is, again, we live and die by the language that's in this contract, and the contract says pays, particularly the loss value were an amount determined by reference thereto. So when we picked out that language, it's extraordinarily important in this situation because again, when you're entering into this termsheet, it is an amount that's determined by reference to stipulated loss value; at least that's the starting point.

The second point I just wanted to make, and again, Your Honor, when you're looking at that, make sure that you look at Section 15(g) of the lease, because it specifically states that upon the occurrence of any event of default, the lessor may exercise any right or remedy which may be available under applicable law, made by appropriate actions to force the terms, et cetera.

So it's our opinion that we do have the right, or really, the indenture trustee has the right to do what it's doing with respect to the termsheet, and entering into a new agreement with us, and we do believe that those remedies are available to the indenture trustee, especially in the situation here, you know, where there is the defense, and then to default (indiscernible) that has occurred and is continuing.

And then I guess the third point would just be that obviously, with respect to your termsheet, parties are entering into new restructuring agreements and new leases and

(indiscernible) documents (indiscernible) in furtherance of the termsheet that Your Honor is expected to order, so we just point those things out.

THE COURT: Okay.

MS. FENNING: And, Your Honor, if I may, just one comment.

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. FENNING: We do not contend that the restructuring agreements are somehow invalid contracts. Rather, what we are contending is that they're not consistent with the operative documents and, therefore, they don't trigger the exclusion or the dissent, if you will, against the TIA claim that says it's being paid under the SLV.

I mean, if the debtors' argument were correct, the letters should say the SLV in the agreement called for a payment of \$90 million. We are paying 90 million, minus 89,999,000; and, therefore, that's a claim by reference -- and not by reference to SLV. That is not what these documents contemplate. They have formulas that have provisions for certain offsets, and that is what my reference to the -- and we would ask you to consider that as you look at this issue again.

THE COURT: Yes. I was going to say that I didn't think that what Ms. Fenning was arguing was any different, was that the termsheet was unlawful or unenforceable, but rather it simply didn't fall within the trigger phrase language for an

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exclusion under Section 6(c), and I -- and you've said it very
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   well.
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            All right. I think I understand the issue.
                                                          I will go
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   back and look at that again, and get something out on that.
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   Okay?
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            MR. SMOLEV: Your Honor, it's Richard Smolev.
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            Are we done with Objection 2? Because if so, I'd like
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   to move back to Objection 1.
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            THE COURT:
                        Sure.
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            MR. SMOLEV: Thank you.
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            I have three comments, the first of which is the
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   easiest comment you're going to get on this phone call, which
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   is my name was left off of the opinion.
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            THE COURT: Oh, dear. I apologize.
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            MR. SMOLEV: That's okay. So that's one.
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            My other comments are directed to a finding that you
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   made at Page 10.
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            THE COURT:
                       Okay.
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            MR. SMOLEV: And specifically, it's the paragraph
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   below the quoted item. At the end of that paragraph, you say
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   that the indenture trustee has demanded that Delta pay, and
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   Delta is required to pay SLV. I have two things to say,
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   because that's not true. That's no factually true. Three of
   my tails are on the Bingham termsheet. So those three tails
   are situated exactly as 182DN with respect to whether Delta is
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paying SLV.

Now, in fairness, those are three tails where the owner/participant interest was sold, and Wilmington Trust, in its objection, raised that as a second defense, and you might remember, we had a discussion when that point came up at the March 30th hearing, where both Mr. Wiles and Mr. Elliott agreed that that issue would be saved for another day.

So I don't want to comment on those three tails without letting you know what will be coming, either in a follow-on objection or, if you prefer, we can brief that in the context of this objection. But three of my tails already are on the Bingham termsheet, so it's our position that just as 182DN is on the Bingham termsheet and Delta is not paying SLV, it's not paying SLV with respect to those three tails.

The second point deals with --

THE COURT: Wait a second.

MR. SMOLEV: I'm sorry. Yes, sir?

THE COURT: Let's just deal with that.

MR. SMOLEV: Sure.

THE COURT: You're right. I did not attempt to focus, especially with regard to your client's situation, which I found very mystifying, on the specific arguments that might be made with regard to particular planes, because I thought that you had at least one or two planes that -- as to which the arguments you were making were applicable. Maybe you don't.

But that's the premise of the decision that I made.

Now, to the extent that three of your planes are similar to, or in the situation covered by the termsheet, that is the same termsheet that covers 182DN, obviously I would decide -- well, wait a second. The language is different, isn't it? 7(c) is different from 6(c).

MR. SMOLEV: My language is required to pay. There's no "by reference to" (sic) in any of my tails. So my point is simply that they are --

THE COURT: Well, I guess -- you know, I will reconsider what I've written concerning 182DN and the termsheet, but assuming that I don't change my view with regard to 182DN and the termsheet, I would assume that all of you would view that decision as applicable to any other tails that are covered by the termsheet in the Bingham Group. Is that what it is? The Bingham Group termsheet?

MR. SMOLEV: Well, yes, sir, but if I might, it goes beyond that, because after the March 30th argument, we received notice from the debtor, and the debtor filed schedules. Of its plan schedules, 10.4(e), as in Edward, identified post-petition restructuring agreements that the debtor has entered into. All eight of the DFO tails are on that schedule, and in all eight instances, Delta is retaining the aircraft, just as it is under the tails — under the Bingham termsheet, and I believe is paying some amount for lease protection damages that, as Ms.

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Fenning said, bears no relationship to the contract definition or construction of SLV.

With respect to those tails, Mr. Wiles and I have been discussing access to those restructuring agreements because I do not have them and Delta has agreed to make them available to me, and I agreed to ask Your Honor to allow us to file them under seal, so that my reconsideration would be along the grounds, not only with respect to those three tails that are on the Bingham termsheet, but with respect to all of my tails, there are now agreements to which Delta is a party, under which it's keeping the aircraft, paying a lesser amount than SLV, and I would be asking Your Honor to make the ruling in the context of facts which we just didn't have as of the March 30th hearing.

THE COURT: Well, two points. One, you know, I don't really do ceiling. You do the ceiling. Somebody else does the ceiling. All I care about is that I get the documents in full text that I need to decide motions. So get me documents in full text that you want me to look at, and if you want to put a big stamp on them that says, document filed under seal, fine, but at least give me the document. I'm not helped by having exhibits in a binder that basically say, document withheld under seal, or something like that. That's point one.

MR. SMOLEV: As soon as I get the documents, I will, Your Honor. Thank you.

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THE COURT: Point two, absolutely my decision is addressed only to the points that I've addressed, and if you — if it turns out that you have eight planes, tails, whatever you call them, that fall under the rationale of what I wrote concerning 182DN, why, you know, unless I'm persuaded to change my views on 182DN, which I might be, or your facts are a little different from the 182DN facts, yes, I would expect to rule in the same way, and I would expect you to bring those to me if it's still an issue that's open for litigation. I realize that everybody has the right to appeal from my rulings, but the rulings that I make for 182DN are going to be the same rulings I'm going to make on planes that are subject to the same termsheet, and don't have some other facts that would dictate a different result.

Now, as far as the fact that Section 7(c) is worded differently from 6(c), I'm not sure that's going to make any difference with regard to the 182DN termsheet situation, but I'd be happy to hear argument or briefs on it.

But oh, by all means, bring those matters to my attention if you feel that what I've written here doesn't cover your situation.

MR. SMOLEV: We will, Your Honor. Thank you very much. That concludes the points for which DFO will be asking for reconsideration with respect to Objection No. 1.

THE COURT: Okay. I really considered that I've dealt

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only with three issues. One is the so-called cosmic argument, and I think that is going to cut across all of the lines. My view is that the contracts control, and that a generalized rule of law is not going to be applied by me, anyway, to -- in a manner that is inconsistent with what the contracts say. So I will be governed by the contracts.

As to -- the second point is that Section 7(c), I've ruled on my views as to 7(c), and I've ruled on my views as to Section 6(c), and I've given you my views with regard to the termsheet airplanes, unless there are some facts with regard to other planes that may be subject to the termsheet that I really need to factor into my thinking. And, of course, unless I change my mind and realize that I've gone off the spoon on 182. I don't think so, but I'm going to definitely look at it.

Anything else?

MS. FENNING: Your Honor, this is Lisa Fenning.

May I inquire whether the notebooks that were provided to you did include the operative -- unredacted, operative documents for TIA 2? As a creditor, we have no knowledge of exactly what notebook was provided, and I want to verify that before you look at these issues again, that you do, in fact, have, at your fingertips, all of the operative documents that were submitted for TIA 2.

THE COURT: Let me put it this way. I did have all the operative documents annexed to one of the responses on

Objection 1. I think I did, anyway. I think I may not have had the entirety of the documents on Objection 2, although maybe I did, but I can tell you this. I did focus very carefully on the specific provisions that were brought to my attention in the papers.

MS. FENNING: The only question, Your Honor, is whether we should submit another copy. I do intend to file a motion for reconsideration and address the Travelers issues separately with respect to how it directs — the contracts ought to be interpreted and applied in bankruptcy, and will submit an appropriate set of papers on that.

But I just wanted to make sure whether you wanted me to submit another set of the operative documents in connection with that, or whether you already had those available, as you look at these issues again.

THE COURT: Well, I probably don't. It is the practice, in my chambers, to discard motion papers because otherwise, we would be moving around our office in little runnels between tall stacks of documents that nobody could find anymore. We have too much paper on too many cases to keep anything, really. So I guess that answers your question.

 $$\operatorname{MS.}$ FENNING: I'll be happy to resubmit the action. Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. EDELMAN: Your Honor, this is Mike Edelman from

Vedder Price. 1 THE COURT: Yes, sir? 2 MR. EDELMAN: Earlier in the conversation, I believe 3 that the debtors raised that they felt that your decision 4 hadn't addressed the SLV objections, and as I said earlier, I 5 thought your decision had, and I think your decision, 6 interspersed on 11 and 12, where you said that the -- there is 7 no basis for the objection to the SLV, that is undisputed, that 8 at the end -- I'm trying to look at the language, but -- so you 9 basically dismissed the objection to the SLV claim and I 10 believe the rationale was that because prior to the time on the SLV claims arose, which was bankruptcy filing, there were -- no 12 J claim had been asserted. 1.3 THE COURT: Yes. I recall that. 14 MR. EDELMAN: I just wanted to -- I don't think you 15 set that forth in your list of three items. 16 THE COURT: Okay. Well, I guess the bottom line is 17 that in terms of what was before me, objections to SLV claims 18 were overruled. I believe that's the -- that was my 19 conclusion. 2.0 MR. EDELMAN: Yes. 21 THE COURT: All of the objections to SLV claims that 22

were before me have been overruled.

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MR. WILES: Your Honor, just a clarifying question. And it's Michael Wiles. I'm looking at Page 12 and I agree, on

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the DFO claims, where you struck all of the TIA claims, you said that Section 7(c) of the TIA is applicable, and Section 8(c) of the participation agreement is not. I understood that to mean that Section 8(c) of the participation agreement was not applicable because there was no TIA claim to begin with. THE COURT: Right. MR. WILES: The question Mr. Hansen was raising about the participation agreement adjustment provisions is if your position stays the same on 182DN, where you did not strike the TIA claim --THE COURT: Well --MR. WILES: -- then we don't have to get to that issue. THE COURT: Is there an objection to -- I don't think there's any objection by Delta to the claim based on the termsheet in 182DN. Is there? MR. WILES: You know, Your Honor, there's no objection. There is to the extent of the overlap. There is on the Section 8(c) of the participation agreement (indiscernible). THE COURT: Well, okay. I didn't understand that.

THE COURT: Well, okay. I didn't understand that. I allowed -- I overruled the objection with regard to 182DN of the TIA claim. To the extent that that means that Delta is objecting to its termsheet agreement, to the claim based on its termsheet agreement on 182DN, I guess I would overrule that,

since my understanding is that it is, in fact, not an SLV claim, it's a termsheet claim.

Now you have said that I'm wrong and that I have to -do you want me to go back and look at Tab 11, Exhibit 1, Page
2, and look at the references to SLV, and I will do that. But
if I -- if the bottom line is that I don't change my view with
regard to 182DN, then certainly, as it is implicit, and I can
make it explicit, that any objection to the claim that results
from Delta having agreed to and stipulated to a claim under a
termsheet, that's overruled. I didn't understand that there
was any.

MR. BOTTER: Your Honor, it's David Botter from Akin Gump, and hopefully Mr. Hansen might have a reference, but in the termsheet that you approved in February, which we all refer to as the Bingham termsheet, both the debtors and committee reserved all of their rights to object on the overlap grounds identified by Mr. Wiles. So while there may have been the agreement as to how you would calculate the claim by reference to SLV, the reservation was specific as to this particular issue.

THE COURT: Well, you know, you're going to have to brief that. If it's anything -- you're going to have to brief the argument if the argument is based on anything other than the cosmic argument, because I don't know what your argument is, and I haven't -- I'm sorry, I just haven't focused on your

argument to the extent that your argument, on the Bingham termsheet plane, 182DN, is anything other than a cosmic argument.

UNIDENTIFIED: Your Honor, what would be the course of preference? What's the most useful and helpful way we can address all these issues for you? Would you like additional submissions on some of the points, all of the points?

THE COURT: As I said before, I have never declined an opportunity to reconsider or reargue, whatever you want to call it. I always grant motions to reargue. I might not change the outcome, but I will always hear the merits of anybody's request to reconsider because the plain fact is, maybe I didn't get it the first time around, and I'm grateful for an opportunity to reconsider.

MR. SMOLEV: Your Honor, it's Richard Smolev. Might I ask a scheduling question?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. SMOLEV: Would the Court prefer to set a date by which we all file whatever papers we want to file, and then a simultaneous response date, or would you prefer that we do separate motions for reconsideration?

THE COURT: Gosh, you know, I would like you to do whatever is easiest for you. I really -- I don't care.

I don't know that it's going to be -- if you think -- unless I've really clearly overlooked something in your papers,

I have considered the arguments rather carefully that I have addressed in -- from Page 13 on, with regard to number two.

Anybody is welcome to ask me to reconsider that. I don't think my view is going to change, but as I said, I'm happy to hear -- I'm happy to read anything you'd like to put before me very concisely, and to the extent that you need me to look at specific agreements in toto again, annex them, whether they're sealed or not, okay?

MR. ELLIOTT: Your Honor, if I could, this is Mark Elliott with Bingham. We represent certain SLV claimants on Objection No. 1.

We will not be making a motion to reconsider because we believe that, Your Honor, our Objection 1, both with respect to the inclusion clause in the TIA, as well as your interpretation of the relevant clause in the participation agreement, got it exactly right, but we would request the opportunity to respond to any reconsideration motion.

And in that regard, with respect to Mr. Smolev's comments, regardless of whether or not Your Honor may change his opinion or not with respect to 182, the language of Section 7(c), exclusion clause relevant to Objection No. 1, your decision was based on that explicit language of SLV being required to be paid, or required to pay, rather, which was triggered by certain lease events, which event was the default under the lease, which did occur here.

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So regardless of how Your Honor sees the termsheet and its interaction with Objection No. 2 and that language, there's no question that under Objection No. 1, that inclusion clause applies because of how Your Honor correctly interpreted that lease and we, of course, would want the opportunity to respond to any reconsideration of that.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me suggest this. I'm going to be away for about a week and a half. Let me suggest that on whatever schedule you like, but probably the sooner the better, anybody that wishes for me to reconsider anything, or that needs me to function on some issue that is within the scope of Objections 1 or 2 that I didn't address, such as, for example, the -- whatever it is, five tails or eight tails that Mr. Smolev referred to, that he says are termsheet -- Bingham termsheet planes.

Lay it out for me very tersely and concisely, and make sure that you bring to my attention issues that I have not addressed, that you need me to address. Okay?

MR. SMOLEV: Absolutely. On behalf of DFO, thank you, Your Honor.

MS. FENNING: Your Honor, we will do so on behalf of Northwestern Mutual, but let me just clarify something. No order has been entered on the objection, technically. The appeal here is not yet triggered, which means that while we can reach agreement, we don't have to worry about a ten-day appeals

period, as I understand the situation.

THE COURT: Oh, no. I think that the appeal period -let's wait until -- let's not have any order until you all are
persuaded that I'm either going to be right or wrong, but
you're not going to change my mind.

MS. FENNING: I just was seeking clarification, to make sure we all are on the same page.

THE COURT: Oh, quite so.

UNIDENTIFIED: I agree with that a hundred percent.

MR. CROWLEY: Your Honor, it's Leo Crowley for the Bank of New York, on Objection No. 2.

As to two of the aircraft on that objection, I haven't heard anything about a motion for reargument, but I'd like to ask Your Honor to sever the objection as it relates to those two aircraft.

MS. FENNING: Mr. Crowley, this is Lisa Fenning. I indicated I do intend to file a motion to reconsider as to all of the Northwestern Mutual claims.

MR. CROWLEY: I didn't hear anything about anything, other than N182, actually.

MS. FENNING: I mean, I like N182. I'm not asking for reconsideration of that ruling. I am seeking a reconsideration on the other.

MR. CROWLEY: Your Honor, in that case, I haven't heard any basis for reconsideration. I'm going to ask for a

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final order on that because we've got tens of millions of dollars of distributions on those tails being held up by Delta, and a resolution of this issue. I'm going to ask for a final order on that. I don't think I should have to wait for completion of the motion or reargue.

MS. FENNING: Your Honor, the issues are intertwined. As I've indicated, I believe that Travelers Insurance, which came down just days before our hearing and after we had an opportunity to brief, should be considered, and that certain parts of the opinion should be reconsidered in light of that ruling. And I would appreciate the opportunity to brief it because it does have a very broad scope and effect.

MR. CROWLEY: Your Honor, the reason I seek a final order is my underlying bondholders are exposed to market risk on Delta stock.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. CROWLEY: And if I have a final order, and if Ms. Fenning wants to move for a stay pending appeal, and if she wants to post on behalf of her clients, undertaking, securing us against the risk of Delta stock declining in value, then that's fine.

MS. FENNING: Mr. Crowley, a motion for reconsideration would say that, in any event, and it's my intention to file it, so I don't know what would be served by issuing a separate order prior to that, on that issue.

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MR. BOTTER: And, Your Honor, there is no integral distribution case contemplated by the plan of reorganization that you confirmed in this case, which was (indiscernible).

THE COURT: Say that again. I didn't get it.

MR. BOTTER: Your Honor, this is the same issue that we addressed on an emergency basis with respect to the Bingham (indiscernible), and Your Honor said bring a motion, which was (indiscernible) never brought -- it was brought with respect to certain (indiscernible) of the plan contemplates interim distribution. The initial distribution was with respect to claims that are allowed as of the effective date. With respect to claims that are just viewed -- just like any other claims that are disputed, Mr. Crowley has disputed claims, they would be resolved as they're resolved. And ultimately, there are interim distributions set up in the plan for six months from So it seems to me that there's plenty of time, and Mr. Crowley would not have the opportunity to get any sort of distribution, absent an amendment to the plan of reorganization.

UNIDENTIFIED: Well, we're going to move to have the claim allowed, Your Honor, based on this ruling. And as soon as it were paid, it would be six months from now or six months from the initial distribution date, which I believe was May 1st or April 30th.

MR. CROWLEY: But that's not the way we read the plan.

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UNIDENTIFIED: And that's also a subject that we have
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   a motion on file with the Court.
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            UNIDENTIFIED: That's a whole different --
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            THE COURT: Excuse me. I'm sorry. Who is it that
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   wants an immediate order?
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            MR. CROWLEY: Leo Crowley, Your Honor, with respect to
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   tails and 803DE and 804DE.
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            THE COURT: Okay. I don't deal too well with tails.
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   Are you an SLV claim, or a TIA claim?
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            MR. CROWLEY: SLV claim, Objection No. 2. It's two
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   out of three aircraft on Objection No. 2. It's an SLV claim.
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            THE COURT: It's an SLV claim.
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            MR. CROWLEY: Right.
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            THE COURT: Who objects to the outcome on the SLV
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   claim? Nobody.
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            MS. FENNING: Your Honor --
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            THE COURT: I mean other than the debtor. The debtor
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   disagrees, I quess.
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            MR. BOTTER: As does the creditors' committee, Your
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   Honor.
            THE COURT: Okay. But this is -- the only objection
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   to the SLV claim, putting aside the termsheet -- we're not
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   talking about the termsheet claim, are we?
            MR. CROWLEY: We are not.
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            THE COURT: We're talking about a real SLV claim,
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right?

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MR. CROWLEY: That is correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, why shouldn't Mr. Crowley have an order on that, because the only objection to the SLV claim was basically the cosmic argument, right?

MS. FENNING: Your Honor, if I may, this is Lisa Fenning.

We will be seeking reconsideration on the TIA claim, and the concern, I believe, is that if our -- if the TIA ruling has changed, you know, that the objection is overruled with respect to those two tails, then if Mr. Crowley is allowed to go ahead and get paid, then there would be no opportunity to consider whether the adjustment issue is right because after the TIA claim is allowed, if it is eventually allowed --

THE COURT: No.

MS. FENNING: And the two, I think, are linked together and I would suggest that there is agreement that the debtor and the committee, so to speak. We would believe that it's appropriate to consider the whole thing as a package, because it may -- if you do change your mind and allow the two TIA claims with respect to liability, then you may reconsider the question of whether the SLV adjustment is necessary and appropriate.

THE COURT: The only basis on which I might reconsider the SLV claim would be the cosmic argument, and I am not

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changing my views on that. The only other basis would be 8(c),
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   but 8(c) is not applicable, in my view, and I've ruled that,
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   and that is my view, whether or not I end up changing my views
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   on whether 7(c) bars a claim under the TIA. I don't believe
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   there's any chance that I'm going to be changing my views on
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   that.
            MS. FENNING:
                          If I may clarify, Your Honor, as to
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   these tails, it's 6(c) in the TIA inclusionary language,
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   it's --
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            THE COURT: Oh, you're talking about Objection 2.
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   It's 6(c).
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            MS. FENNING: Yes, Your Honor. Okay. I just wanted
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   to make sure --
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            THE COURT: Yes. No, I'm sorry. I was in the
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   wrong --
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            MS. FENNING: Okay, but I do not anticipate any
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   circumstance under which I would change my view that the
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   objection to the SLV claim in Objection 2, claim or claims,
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   with regard to whatever airplanes are covered, I don't see any
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   basis under which I would change that conclusion, namely that
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   the objection to the SLV claims, as opposed to the Bingham
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   termsheet claims, is overruled, and the reason for that is,
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   number one, the cosmic argument fails, as a matter of law, in
   my view, as any basis to bar or reduce SLV claims.
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Secondly, the analog for 8(c), under the participation

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agreement in Objection 2, whatever it is, assuming that it is substantially the same as 8(c) in Objection 1, is not the kind of reduction to the SLV claim that would result where previously there's a TIA claim which then results in an 8(c) type reduction in SLV. I'm not aware that there is any such fact here. Okay?

So I don't see why the overruling of the objection to SLV claims in Objection 1 and 2 should not result in an immediate order, because I cannot imagine any circumstance under which I would change that ruling. And it obviously does matter, at least to the holder of SLV claims.

So is there any reason why, given the attitude that I've just expressed on the SLV claims, those should not be allowed now, and an order entered appropriately?

MR. WILES: Your Honor, this is Michael Wiles. I have one procedural question that I haven't thought all the way through, but it might make it a problem.

As it stands right now, let's say we had to issue a separate order with regard to the SLV. On claims where you have presently ruled that our TIA claim goes away, in that posture, I do not believe the debtors and the committee would have a right to appeal because the orders and decision on file would be in their favor as to the ultimate result.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. WILES: In other words, the TIA claim would go

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away. If you separate them and you allow the SLV claim and then reconsider and then rule later on the TIA claim, it creates a risk that if you were to change your mind on the TIA claim going away, that the time to appeal would have expired on the SLV claim, and that's a potential prejudice to the debtors and the committee.

THE COURT: Well, I do see that. What's the answer to that? I will say that I envision almost no likelihood -- I can't really envision any likelihood that I will change my view on the TIA claims, on Objections 1 and 2.

Having said that, you're right. You put your finger on a problem. I don't know that it's a real problem.

MR. SMOLEV: Your Honor, this is Richard Smolev. I ask you not to pre-judge, particularly inasmuch as on all eight of my tails now, Delta has the aircraft and the Court should respectfully keep an open mind to determine if what it's paying is SLV, because it very well may be that the facts now don't support what the debtor is suggesting.

THE COURT: Now, this is Mr. Smolev?

MR. SMOLEV: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And you're now talking about the fact that you're now telling me that all of your planes may be covered by my ruling on 182DN.

MR. SMOLEV: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: And what is that? Objection 1?

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MR. SMOLEV: My tail, yes. My tail is in Objection 1. Three of them are on the Bingham termsheet. Five of them, -- and the other five, so all eight are now subject to restructuring agreements. And the --

THE COURT: Okay. I take your point. I take your point. It's kind of too bad not to have had that information.

Maybe I did have it and it went over my head.

MR. SMOLEV: No, no, no. You didn't, Your Honor, because the debtor did not file the schedule until after the March 30th hearing, and I was completely in the dark about those negotiations because I wasn't a party to them. And those are purely between Delta, on the one hand, and the SLV parties on the other, so I could not have brought them to your attention, nor could you have known about them because Delta didn't file Schedule 10.4(e) until the eve of confirmation.

THE COURT: Well --

MR. ELLIOTT: Your Honor, this is Mark Elliott. Mr. Smolev is incorrect in a sense that he pointed out in his brief, and we opposed it, that he pointed out that these were termsheet planes, and we certain talked about the fact that they were termsheet planes. That doesn't change Your Honor's ruling, as I pointed out before, because the language, the critical language difference in Objection 1 excludes (indiscernible), makes a great deal of difference because Your Honor ruled as you did, I believe, because to -- with the event

of default under the lease, Delta was required to pay SLV.

What the parties may have done subsequently, in terms of this agreement, which Your Honor so ordered, doesn't change the fact that the event -- the lease event, whereby Delta was required to pay SLV, didn't transpire, and that was the basis of your ruling, I believe, Your Honor.

So with all due respect to Mr. Smolev, he did know this was termsheet, this was litigated, and I believe Your Honor properly decided it.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, it may be that I should have decided it and should have realized it, but I didn't. So, Mr. Smolev is correct. That remains open, as far as I'm concerned, because I just didn't focus on it. Sorry.

MR. SMOLEV: Thank you, Your Honor. I don't think -- Smolev is talking.

I don't think we're going to raise anything else in this call with respect to TIA/SLV Objection 1, unless the Court has any questions.

THE COURT: Well, what this leaves, then, with regard to Mr. Crowley's point, is only what? A couple of airplanes with respect to which I overruled an objection to their SLV claims, and there's -- am I right, there's really nothing left to litigate on that?

MR. EDELMAN: Your Honor, this is Mike Edelman and Vedder Price. I think that on Mr. Crowley's suggestion, I

think it would be applicable to all the SLV claims.

THE COURT: Well, not -- you mean all the SLV claims in Objection 2?

MR. EDELMAN: Well, I think he said that the two bases for objection of the SLV, you thought that those were dead issues, that there's no cause for argument and that since there's no pre-existing TIA claim at the time of the SLV claim arose, that the adjustment provision in the participation agreement just is not applicable, and that applies to every SLV in Objections 1 and 2.

THE COURT: Well, no. We're repeating ourselves here.

Mr. Smolev has said that there is a ground for changing my

ruling with regard to TIA because there's a Bingham termsheet

argument with regard to Objection 1 that I didn't focus on,

right Mr. Smolev? Right or wrong?

MR. SMOLEV: Yes, sir. That is correct, Your Honor. Thank you.

THE COURT: So that being the case, I have to entertain that argument, which may change the ruling, it may not, with regard to TIA. In Objection --

MR. EDELMAN: I would think, for the final order for the SLV, that's all I was saying, that that suggestion that these are applicable to all the SLV claims, that's all I was saying.

THE COURT: Oh, I see. All the SLVs?

MR. EDELMAN: Yes. 1 MR. WILES: The problem is a procedural issues that I 2 pointed out, though, Your Honor, this is Michael Wiles, is 3 still there. Unlike everybody else, I don't really want to 4 arque the merits of all this. I'm happy to get some papers 5 from you to point out our position, but I don't -- it may sound 6 superficially appealing to enter a separate order, but the 7 objection is based on the whole idea that one of them has to go 8 away, and in the context that we stand right now, we can't 9 really enter a separate order without prejudice to the debtor. 10 THE COURT: What's the answer to that? 11 MR. CROWLEY: This is Leo Crowley, Your Honor. 12 I don't see what the prejudice is, frankly, because 1.3 they never -- as I read the objection just now, I haven't seen them really objecting to the SLV claim on those two aircraft. 15 The objection was to the TIA claim, and you overruled it. 16 MR. WILES: That's just not true. (Indiscernible.) 17 MR. CROWLEY: Looking through their reply here, it 18 19 says: 20 "Point C of the TIA claim should be extinguished due to the distribution that will be made to the holders 21 of the SLV claims." 22 23 MR. WILES: Yes, and in the alternative, what --MR. CROWLEY: I'm looking for "in the alternative," 24

and I don't see it.

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THE COURT: But, Mr. Wiles, the objection to the SLV
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   claim would be either the cosmic argument -- well, basically,
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   it would be the cosmic argument, wouldn't it? Or an 8(c)
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   argument?
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            MR. WILES: It would be both of those. That's
5
6
   correct.
            MR. CROWLEY: Well, Your Honor, Leo Crowley.
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            The cosmic argument, I think you've indicated that you
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   don't want to talk about it anymore, frankly, on these two
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   aircraft, the lease was rejected, as before, we discussed in
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   the oral argument, the lease was rejected at the beginning of
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   the case, so I don't see any basis for invoking any adjustment
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   mechanism on it at all.
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            Now I think these are the -- with respect to Mr.
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   Edelman, I mean, I think these two aircraft are in a unique
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   position. I think there is a basis for finality as to these
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   two right now, and ultimately, as I said before, we'll be
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   seeking a prompt distribution on account of these. The party
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   who agreed by the request for prompt distribution need to
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   persuade you not to order them, or they can put up an
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   undertaking, pending appeal.
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            THE COURT:
                        Why is that not so?
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23
            MR. WILES:
                        What's not so, Your Honor?
            THE COURT: Why is it not so that you can protect your
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rights --

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MR. WILES: Well, let's say we have an order on those planes in favor of Mr. Crowley's client, and at the moment, your decision is in Delta's favor on the TIA claims, with respect to the -- the relief Delta sought was that one of the two claims should be adjusted or should go away, and at the moment, we would be in a position where you would rule in Delta's favor, throwing out one of the claims.

But, by entry of an order with respect to Mr. Crowley, it would start the appeal time running at the same time that you're reconsidering your order with respect to the TIA claim. So what happens if you change your mind?

I think that there's a serious risk that I would have a right to appeal, because you can only appeal if the underlying judgment is against you, and as things would stand on the record, the relief Delta requested would have been granted. The order wouldn't have been finalized, but the relief entered would be in favor of Delta.

But if part of that being reconsidered, you can't start the appeal time running on the other part. It's just not fair to Delta.

MR. CROWLEY: I don't -- this is Leo Crowley, Your Honor.

I'm not sure we really heard much of a basis for reconsideration on this one, to tell you the truth, which is what prompted me to ask for finality, and I think given that

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-- you know, I come back to the proposition of the party who has prevailed in litigation, as we have, is entitled to finality and the benefits that go with finality.

THE COURT: Well, let me ask you this, Mr. Crowley.

If I sign an order allowing your claim and overruling the objection to it in respect of SLV on these claims, and Mr.

Wiles were to file an appeal, would you then argue, oh, you can't file an appeal because you won?

MR. CROWLEY: Your Honor, I think that's right. On this one, he did prevail.

THE COURT: But his point -- his point is that I might change my mind on the TIA. He knows I'm not going to change my mind on the cosmic argument, but I might change my mind and rule that TIA can be paid, in which case he is aggrieved, because he was objecting and saying there had to be an allocation. You can't pay them both. Would you then argue -- no, you can't preserve that argument because at the time, within the ten days, you won.

MR. CROWLEY: No. I mean, I think if you ultimately entered a later order of the type you're describing, which I have to say I think is virtually inconceivable, the entry of that order, if he's aggrieved by it, would be final at that time, if he's aggrieved by it.

But, you know, as a prevailing party now, I think I'm entitled to whatever benefits there are associated with

finality, and one such benefit is using this as a stepping stone to move to compel distribution.

I mean, the flip side is having prevailed in this, if I move at this point, for me it allows this claimant to compel distribution, he's going to come back and say there's no finality in the TIA litigation. I mean, I can only move forward one step at a time.

MR. WILES: It's not a final order, anyway, until the appeals are exhausted.

THE COURT: Yeah.

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MR CROWLEY: (Indiscernible.)

MR. WILES: That's what the plan -- that's how the definition is (indiscernible).

UNIDENTIFIED: Your Honor, maybe this counts for a very fast process on the reconsideration, because if — obviously, the estate is essentially aggrieved, as Mr. Wiles pointed out, in that once the reconsideration is considered, then you are gong to get — we — I (indiscernible) so we could get to the place where, in fact, Mr. Crowley can't file an order and the estate can do whatever it is that it wishes to do in connection with its appellate rights.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this. Who is going to ask for a re-hearing with regard to my ruling on TIA in -- what, Objection 2?

MS. FENNING: Your Honor, this is Lisa Fenning on

behalf of Northwestern Mutual.

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We will be filing a motion for reconsideration with respect to the claim. I understand you have not given me a whole lot of hope for persuading you otherwise, but you've also invited us to take a shot --

THE COURT: Yeah.

MS. FENNING: -- and we do believe we have grounds.

MR. HANSEN: Your Honor, it's Kris Hansen at Stroock.

I mean, to the extent that we want you to reconsider Section (indiscernible) in your ruling, we would file a motion for reconsideration on behalf of the debtor with respect to Point (c) (sic).

THE COURT: You know, well, look, Mr. Crowley. I think we'll -- let me come back to this when we talk about scheduling. I think it would be appropriate for any request for reconsideration to be on my -- in my chambers by a week from this Friday. Any problem with that?

MR. WILES: Not on behalf of the debtors, Your Honor. I think that's fine.

THE COURT: Okay. Together with, you know -- I want you to quote from any documents and if you want to have the entirety of any of these documents before me, give me copies.

I'm sorry that I won't -- I don't still have them. Okay.

MR. SMOLEV: Your Honor, excuse me. It's Richard

25 Smolev. Because the restructuring termsheets are not in my

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possession, and I'm dependent upon Mr. Wiles to get them, I can
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   only comply with that schedule if I have the documents in
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   advance and right now, all we have is an agreement. I have not
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   done a motion to compel. I don't now if you want to direct the
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   debtor to provide me those documents by a date certain.
5
   don't know, Mr. Wiles, if even that's necessary --
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            THE COURT: Okay.
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            MR. SMOLEV: -- if you can get the documents in the
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   next day or two.
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            THE COURT: That's Objection 1, right?
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            MR. SMOLEV: Yes, sir.
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            MR. WILES: I've told you, Richard, I'll get them to
12
   you --
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            MR. SMOLEV: Okay.
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            MR. WILES: I will honor that.
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            MR. SMOLEV: All right. Thank you. All right.
16
   leave it at that for now, Judge.
17
            THE COURT:
                        Okay.
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            MR. SMOLEV: And if there's a hang-up on time, I'll
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   advise chambers.
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            THE COURT: All right. I will look at these, any
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   requests for reconsideration, very promptly. Including, by the
23
   way, the debtors' request for me to reconsider on 182DN, right?
            MR. WILES:
                        Yes.
24
            THE COURT:
                        That's the debtors' request, isn't it?
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MR. WILES: That's correct. 1 UNIDENTIFIED: Yes, Your Honor. 2 THE COURT: All right. Well, you do a brief 3 submission. Annex the Tab 11 document that you want me to look 4 at, and I will function on that very swiftly, and I'll probably 5 function on all of these the following week, early in the 6 following week, and if I want submissions -- reply submissions 7 to any of these motions, I'll let you know before I do 8 anything. 9 If I am at all disposed to grant reconsideration and 10 change my views on any of these, I will certainly ask for 11 responses. Otherwise, I won't burden you with a request for 12 responses. Do you all understand? 13 MR. WILES: Yes. 14 THE COURT: In other words, it won't be necessary to 15 reply to motions for a re-hearing or reconsideration unless I 16 request it. 17 Okay? And then, Mr. Crowley, hopefully I'll have a 18 situation where I can give at least you a final order with 19 regard to your SLV claims in Objection 2. 20 MR. CROWLEY: Thank you, Your Honor. 21 THE COURT: Okay? Anything else? 22 MR. WILES: Have a safe trip, and enjoy wherever 23 you're going. 24

THE COURT:

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Okay.

Thanks a lot.

MR. WILES: Thank you. 1 THE COURT: My --2 MR. EDELMAN: Your Honor, just one last thing. 3 is Mike Edelman from Vedder Price. 4 THE COURT: Yes? 5 MR. EDELMAN: Earlier in the conversation, I think 6 Wiles said that there's going to be a June 6th status 7 conference on the -- on all the other SLV/TIA (indiscernible). 8 UNIDENTIFIED: We don't need that date anymore. 9 That's (indiscernible). 10 MR. EDELMAN: Given the reconsideration, I was going 11 to suggest maybe it would be (indiscernible). 12 UNIDENTIFIED: Yeah. I agree with that. I set that 1.3 date earlier this morning, Your Honor, but I think after this conversation, which was a lot more detailed than I thought it 15 would be, it just wouldn't make sense to have a 16 (indiscernible). 17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 (Counsel speak simultaneously.) 19 20 THE COURT: That's fine. You can reschedule that. Just so you're aware, if emergencies come up and you need to 21 have the Court function on anything when I'm away, let Rosemary 23 DeSalvo know, because she can reach me, or you can take it to a Judge in New York if you want, but I frequently hear things 24 when I'm away. I prefer not to, obviously, but I always will 25

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if it's needful, to have anything heard when I'm away. I'll
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   hear it. Okay?
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            UNIDENTIFIED: Your Honor, one other objection.
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   isn't going to be a generalized SLVJ conference. Maybe June
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   6th would be a good idea to have it, just for these one and two
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   cases. It's just a suggestion, and it seems like it might be
6
   an appropriate time.
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            THE COURT: I think I'd better call you and let you
8
   know, because I'm going to function very quickly, but I may or
9
   may not be able to function by the 6th. But I certainly hope
10
   by the end of the week, to be able to. All right?
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                      Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you very much.
            COUNSEL:
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            THE COURT: Thank you all.
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            COUNSEL: Thank you, Your Honor. Thank you, Judge.
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            THE COURT: Good day.
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        (Proceedings concluded at 6:16 p.m.)
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Gennyer Linnarty

Jennifer Linnartz, AAERT Cert. No. 339

Certified Court Transcriptionist Rand Transcript Service, Inc.

CONDITIONAL CERTIFICATION

I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter produced to the best of my knowledge and ability.*

May 23, 2007

may 25, 2007

*Telephonic comments and arguments of counsel not adequately recorded.